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INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-five years since this Court first interpreted the Inherent Risk Statute 
in Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), it has become clear that ski law in 
Utah is incomprehensible and broken. Juries are determining legal issues that should be 
decided by the court, summary judgment is unavailable in nearly every case, and the 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Model Utah Jury Instructions struggled to 
understand the law and then recently published an unworkable jury instruction that only 
further confuses the legal landscape. Ski Utah 's members include each of Utah's 
fomteen ski resorts, all of which have been defendants in ski cases at some point. 
Because Inherent Risk law is so dysfunctional in tab, the reso1ts have no idea when the 
Inherent Risk Statute may protect them, or how to apply Clover and White v. 
Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994). As a result, Utah ski resorts simply assume the 
Inherent Risk Statute offers no protection at all, something the Utah Legislature clearly 
did not intend when it wrote "no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any 
ski area operator for injury resulting fro m the inherent risks of skiing." Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-4-403 (2016). 
Ski Utah respectfully submits that this Court should ove1Tule Clover and White. 
The principle of stare decisis is weak in this case since Clover and White are only 
twenty-five and twenty-two years old respectively, and neither holding has worked well 
or become so entrenched in Utah law that people rely on, or even know of the decisions. 
Moreover, the precedent has never been unifo1111 ly accepted by this Comt ever 
since White. See, White, 879 P.2d at 1374-75 (Utah 1994) (split decision with J. 
Zimmerman and J. Russon disagreeing with Clover and J. Russon writing Clover was 
"nothing more than judicial legislation" which should be overturned); and see, Rothstein 
v. Snowbird, 175 P.3d 560 *P26 (Utah 2007) (3-2 decision with J. \Vilkins and J. Durrant 
arguing the majority's decision infused the Inherent Risk Statute with "intention not 
expressed by the legislature '). 
If the Court elects to retain Clover and White, there are tlu·ee major problems with 
the decisions which this Court should correct. First, the analysis of whether a risk can be 
"eliminated with reasonable care" means summary judgment is unavailable iu nearly 
every case, something anathema to the legislature 's stated intent to "establish as a matter 
of law that certain risks are inherent in the sport." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-401 (2016). 
In addition, the ana!ysis of whether a risk can be eliminated with reasonable care often 
results in the dangerous argument that the resort could have eliminated the particular risk 
by simply closing the ski run where the injury occurred. This forces resorts to choose 
between either closing a run or facing liability exposure for opening it. In many 
circumstances, resorts have limited both the quantity and difficulty of the ten-ain they 
open due to this dilemma Limiting terrain due to potential liability exposure contradicts 
the legislative intent of the Inherent Risk Statute to encourage the sport of skiing in Utah. 
Second, Clover and White use the terms "eliminate" and "alleviate" 
interchangeably when discussing "whether a risk can be eliminated [ or alleviated] with 
reasonable care." This causes enormous confusion since eve1y risk could theoretically be 
alleviated to some degree or another - an orange cone could be placed in front of every 
ice patch, every tree could be padded, or every rock could be painted yellow - but only a 
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few risks can be completely eliminated. This confusion plagues not only ski resorts and 
skiers, but also lawyers, judges and juries since nobody can say with any certainty what 
the standard actually is. 
Third, Clover and White's requirement that courts determine whether skiers wish 
to confront certain risks or not should be abandoned. Every plaintiff/skier claims, after 
the fact, that they did not wish to confront the risk that injured them so the analysis is 
irrelevant in almost every case. 1vloreover, skiers subjectively wish to confront extremely 
different risks. Some skiers voluntarily take the risk of jumping off towering cliffs, while 
other skiers wish to confront only the risks posed by the "bunny slope." To generally 
impose upon every skier in Utah a set of risks that are judicially determined to be ones 
that every skier wishes to confront is an unworkable blanket approach that is unsupp01ted 
by the text of the Inherent Risk Statute. 
In sum, Ski Utah respectfully submits that Clover and White should be oven-uled 
and ski cases should be decided according to the plain language of the Inherent Risk 
Statute. Judges, not juries, should identify the risk as pled in the plaintiff/skier's 
complaint, and determine whether the risk falls within the scope of the statute. If it does, 
the claim is barred. While some may disagree with the protections the Inherent Risk 
Statute affords to ski resorts, the Utah legislature passed the statute as the elected body of 
this State and neither Clover nor White should override that. The statute simply says "no 
skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury 
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. ' Those clear and plain words should be 
given effect. 
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I. CLOVER AND WHITE SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
A. INHERENT RISK IS A LEGAL QUESTION OF DUTY BUT CLOVER AND 
WHITE INCORRECTLY TRANSFORMED IT INTO A FACT QUESTION 
This Court held that ski resorts have no duty to protect skiers from the inherent 
risks of skiing. Clover, 808 P .2d at 1046 ("ski area operators have no duty to protect a 
skier from the inherent risks of skiing"). The question of whether a defendant owes a 
duty is a question of lm,v. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 2009 UT 44, *P18 (Utah 
2009) ("appellate courts have consistently held that the determination of whether a legal 
duty exists falls to the court.") (citing, Rose v. Provo Citv, 2003 UT App 77, *P8 (Utah. 
Ct. App. 2003) ("Whether a duty of care is owed is entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the court"). In fact, this Court unanimously ruled in Normandeau that the 
question of duty in negligence cases was a question of law even when it involved 
potentially fact-intensive issues. Id, at *Pl9 (duty determined by "analyzing the legal 
relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury 
public policy as to which party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other 
general policy considerations"). 
As a result of the Clover and White decisions, the legal question of what is or is 
not an inherent risk is being answered by juries rather than as a matter of law. The reason 
for this is because of the "two categories of inherent risks" that the Clover com1 invented 
(nowhere mentioned in the Inherent Risk Statute). The categories are: (1) risks that 
skiers wish to confront, or (2) risks that a skiers do not wish to confront but which cannot 
be eliminated (or alleviated) with reasonable care. See Clover, 808 P.2d at 1047. 
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Ski Utah is aware of no cases falling under the first category. This is likely 
because every skier/plaintiff always claims that they did not wish to confront the 
particular risk that injured them - "I wanted to ski steep te1Tain, but not that steep," or "I 
v-.ranted to ski powder but not powder that deep," or "I wanted to ski moguls, but not 
moguls that big/ and so forth. As a result, most of the cases fall into the second category 
where trial courts are asked to decide, usually on summary judgment, \Vhether a risk can 
be eliminated/alleviated with reasonable care. Faced with confusing law and a 
reasonableness standard, most judges send the case to the jury, which contradicts the 
Legislature' s directive "to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in 
the sport of the skiing. ' 
B. THE DANGEROUS PLAINTIFFS' ARGUJ\.ffiNT THAT CLOSING THE 
SK.1 RUN COULD HA VE ELIMINATED THE RISK 
Many judges deny summary judgment for the resort based on the particularly 
dangerous argument that the risk at issue could have been eliminated by closing the ski 
run where the injury occurred. For example, in 2012 the Canyons ski resort moved for 
summary judgment under the Inherent Risk Statute in a wrongful death case where the 
skier/plaintiff was killed in an avalanche that happened inside the res01t's boundaries on 
a designated ski run. Plaintiff in the case argued the Canyons could have eliminated the 
risk of the avalanche by closing the run where the avalanche occurred. Judge Keith Kelly 
accepted Plaintiff's argwnent and denied summary judgment, ruling as follows: 
Comparing this case to Clover, that case involved a blind jump that resulted 
in i11jury of a skier below. This court concludes that one way in which the 
risk of that blind jump could have been alleviated was to close the jump. 
Similarly in this case, Plaintiff has presented evidence that the risk of 
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avalanche on the Red Pine Chute on Decemb r 23, 2007 could have been 
eliminated by closing the run until it had been made safe for skiers. 
See, Ex. A. 
Although Canyons ultimately prevailed in the jury trial 1, the district com1' s ruling is 
unfortunately typical in ski cases and it has a particularly dangerous impact on ski resorts. It 
puts ski resorts in the position of choosing between facing liability for opening runs, because 
all ski runs have risks of one kind or another or closing ski runs to avoid liability which 
diminishes the pleasure, variety, challenge, and the integral nature of the sport of skiing. This 
"Catch-22" is contrary to the legislature s stated public policy of encouraging skiing in Utah 
- "the Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by large numbers of residents in 
Utah and attracts a large number of nomesidents, significantly contributing to the economy of 
this state." Utah Code Ann. §78B-4-401 (2016) . 
In addition, this Court noted in Rothstein that the Inherent Risk Statute was passed due 
to uncertainty about what claims skiers could make against resorts which caused insurers to 
either deny coverage to resorts or charge impossibly high premiums: 
According to the Legislature, it was necessary to immunize ski area 
operators from liability for injuries caused by inherent risks because they 
were otherwise being denied insurance coverage or finding coverage too 
expensive to purchase .. . The central purpose of the Act, then, was to permit 
ski area operators to purchase insurance at affordable rates. The insulation 
1 The jury determined the Canyons was not liable because every steep run with new snow 
at any ski resort may avalanche at any time, or maybe not at all , even when the reso11 has 
used extensive and pov,1erful avalanche mitigation tools such as explosives. Thus, there 
is no exact point in time when a run is perfectly safe from avalanches, and even if there 
was, it is not humanly possible for ski resort personnel to predict when that point in time 
might arrive or how long it will last, or whether the entire run is "safe" as opposed to just 
portions of the run. Neither ski res011 personnel nor anyone else can predict Mother 
Nature with such prescience. 
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of ski area operators from liability for injmies caused by inherent risks of 
skiing was a means to that end ... [The statute] is intended to clarify those 
inherent risks of skiing to which liability will not attach so that ski 
resort operators may obtain insurance coverage to protect them from 
those risks that are not inherent to skiing. 
Rothstein, 175 P.3d at 564 (Utah 2007) (3-2 decision with J. Wilkins and J. Dru-rant 
arguing the majority's decision infused the Inherent Risk Statute with ' intention not 
expressed by the legislature") ( emphasis added) . 
If a skier/plaintiff can avoid the Inherent Risk Statute by simply claiming the 
particular risk giving rise to the claimed injury is not inherent because the resort could 
have eliminated it by closing the run, neither the resorts nor their insurers can determine 
which risks are inherent (no insurance necessary) and which are not inherent (insurance 
necessary). As a result and as it stands now, resorts and their insw-ers simply assume 
every claimed injury creates liability exposure, which reverts the ski industry back to the 
situation it was in before the Inherent Risk Statute was passed thi1ty-seven years ago: 
The Legislature ... finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide 
liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the premiums 
charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent years due to 
confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of 
skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law in relation 
to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a 
matter of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide 
that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall 
recover/ram a ski operator for injuries resultingji-om those inherent risks. 





C. THE CURRE T MUJI ITJRY INSTRUCTION O INHERENT RISK IS 
UNWORKABLE BECAUSE CLOVER AND WHITE HA VE 
CONFUSED INHERENT RISK LAW 
The MU.TI jury instruction on the inherent rjsks of skiing is further evidence of the 
dysfunctional state of ski law in Utah. The instruction was adopted in February of2012 
by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee after three months of debate. It reads: 
There are two types of inherent rjsks of skiing: 
The first are risks that skiers want to confront or that [ name of defendant] 
cannot eliminate by using reasonable care. [Name of defendant] has no 
obligation to eliminate these types of risks. 
The second are risks that skiers do not want to confront and that [name of 
defendant] can eliminate by using reasonable care. Such risks are also 
inherent in skiing but [name of defendant] must use reasonable care to 
eliminate risks of this second type. 
Not only is this instruction wrong because the question of whether something is an 
inherent risk is a question of duty that should be answered by the court, not a jury, but the 
instruction is also incorrect because it confuses the tests for first and second category 
risks. Under the first category, the sole analysis is ,,vhether the paiiicular risk giving rise 
to the claim is ai1 integral part of skiing that a skier wishes to confront. White, 879 P.2d 
at 1375 ("The first [category] consists of risks that skiers wish to confront while skiing, 
for example, steep grades, powder snow, and mogul runs"). There is no mention in 
either White, Clover, or the Inherent Risk Statute about whether the resort might be able 
to eliminate a first category risk with reasonable care. The reasonable care analysis is 
only applicable to second category risks. Clover, 808 P.2d at 1047 ("the second category 
of risks consists of those hazards which no one wishes to confront but which cannot be 
alleviated by the use of reasonable care"). 
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The incolTect statement of the lav,1 contained in the jury instruction reflects the 
confused state of inherent risk law in Utah, and underscores the need for this Colll1 to 
overturn Clover and White. If the MUTI Committee struggled to correctly state the law 
after tlu-ee months of debate, and if trial judges and attorneys continually struggle to 
apply Clover and White, it is unfair to tell jmors to figure it out for themselves. 
D. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NO OVERRIDE THE LEGISLATURE'S 
TE T 
This Court's Supplemental Briefing Order asks the parties what role the principle 
of stare decisis should play in the Com1's consideration of whether to ove1Tule Clover 
and White. Ski Utah 's position is that Clover and White effectively overruled the 
legislature because they gutted the Inherent Risk Statute. In a constitutional democracy 
where the balance of pov,,ers is sacrosanct, the principal of stare decisis should not serve 
to solidify and perpetuate bad legal precedent that undermined a valid legislative act. Ski 
Utah therefore respectfully submits that stare decisis should not play a role in the Court's 
determination of whether to oven-ule Clover and White. 
If stare decisis is considered, the holding in Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21 
(Utah 2015) is instructive. In Eldridge, this Court overturned a string of prior precedent 
regarding the "improper purpose" element of claims for intentional interference with 
economic relations. Id., at *P64 (citing, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) 
["Stare decisis is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last resort."); 20 
Am. Jm. 2d Courts§ 131 (2005) ["The principle that a court should not ovenule its own 
precedents is not a binding legal rule to be blindly followed .... "). 
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The factors this Com1 considers in wh ther to overturn prior precedent were the 
following: (1) the persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the precedent 
was originally based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established in the law 
since it was handed down. Id. , at *P22. Under the second factor, the considerations 
include the age of the precedent, hov .. , well it has worked in practice, its consistency with 
other legal principles, and the extent to which people s reliance on the precedent would 
create injustice or hardship if it were overturned. Id. 
1. Clover and White Are Not Persuasive Precedent 
In addition to the reasons explained above as to why Clover and White are not 
persuasive precedent, this Court in Eldridge noted that the bad prior precedent contained 
holdings unsupported by any authority. Id. at *P24 ( citing Laney v. Fairview Citv, 2002 
UT 79, ~ 46 (Utah 2002) ['The precedent rejected in Menzies was established with little 
analysis and without reference to authority"]). The Clover decision cites no authority 
whatsoever for its holding that there are "two categories of inherent risks." The Clover 
court simply invented the categories without citing any Utah case law, any out-of-state 
case law, or any secondary legal authority. Similarly, neither Clover nor White relied on 
any legislative history regarding whether the legislature intended to have inherent risks 
categorized, or whether it expected courts or juries to consider which risks skiers wish to 
confront. 
In addition, in White, which was the first appellate case where the litigants 
attempted to apply Clover, this Court was split 3-2 on the persuasiveness of Clover's 
reasomng. See, White 879 P.2d at 1377 (CJ. Zimmerman writing "I may not agree with 
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Clover v. Snowbird ... , a decision in which I did not participate" and J. Russon writing "I 
believe Clover is clearly wrong and constitutes nothing more than judicial legislation") . 
The only other case since White that touched on the Inherent Risk Statute was Rothstein 
v. Snowbird which was also a split 3-2 decision. See, Rothstein, 175 P .3d at *P26 
(Justices Wilkins and Durrant dissenting). Thus, ever since Clover, this Corui has been 
uncomfo1iable with the holding, and at least four separate Justices considered Clover 
wholly unpersuasive. 
2. Clover and White Are Not Firmly Established 
Clover and White are only twenty-five and tv,,enty-two years old respectively. 
The string of precedent this Comi overturned in Eldridge dated back more than thirty 
years. Clover and White are also not "established since the earliest days of statehood," 
another factor this Court considered when it overturned the precedent in Eldridge. 
Likewise, neither Clover nor White are regularly relied upon by the public. There 
are no other appellate cases where the "t\;l,'O categories of risks" were addressed 
(Rothstein dealt with releases of liability) and Ski Utah is unaware of any evidence that 
Utah's skiing public relies upon, or even knows about, Clover and White. In Eldridge, 
there were "dozens" of cases citing the precedent this Comi overturned. See, Eldridge, 
2015 UT 21 at *P37. Furthermore, Eldrid2:e noted that the vagueness of the improper 
purpose doctrine and the difficu lty litigants faced applying it meant any public reliance 
on the doctrine was "foolhardy." Id. at *P38. The holdings under Clover and White are 
arguably even more vague and difficult to apply than the principles overturned 
in Eldridge. 
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3. Clover and White Have Not Worked Well and Are Inconsistent 
With Other Principles of Law 
For the reasons explained above, neither Clover nor White have worked well. 
Summary judgment in ski cases is almost never available, juries are deciding legal 
questions of duty and the jury instruction is umvorkable. There is no consistency or 
useful guidance from the courts that ski resorts can rely on to determine which risks are 
inherent and which are not. It is a jury question every time, resulting in unpredictable 
outcomes and variable verdicts. 
This dysfunctional state of ski law in Utah is also inconsistent with other 
principles of law. Clover and White are inconsistent with the Inherent Risk Statute 
because it instructs that cases should be decided "as a matter of law." Utah Code Alm. § 
78B-4-401 (2016). Also inconsistent are the two categories of risks under Clover. As 
Justice Russon put it: 
The inherent risks of skiing statute does not as Clover and the majority 
state, categorize inherent risks, nor does it establish a ' reasonable care' 
standard for certain types of inherent risks. To the contrary it plainly states 
that 'no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area 
operator for injury resulting from the inherent risks of skiing.' Rather than 
misconstruing the plain language of the inherent risks of skiing statute in 
order to formulate a judicially prescribed result, this court should apply the 
plain language of that statute to the facts in this case and leave the possible 
infirmities of the statute for the legislature to remedy. 




II. THE ANALYSIS UNDER THE INHERENT RISK STATUTE SHOULD 
NOT INCLUDE A DETERMINATION OF WHICH RISKS SKIERS WISH 
TO CONFRONT 
The Court's second question in its Supplement Briefing Order asks, if Clover 
and White are not overturned, what factors are relevant to a determination of which risks 
are those that skiers wish to confront and v-.rhich are not? Ski Utah respectfully submits 
that this is an impossible analysis. As a threshold matter, nothing in the Inherent Risk 
Statute directs courts to engage in this inquiry, so courts and juries have no statutory 
language or any other legislative guidance upon which to base their decisions. That alone 
warrants eliminating the analysis of whether a skier wishes to confront a risk. 
More fundamentally, hov,1ever, it is an impossible analysis because each individual 
skier may subjectively wish to confront dramatically different risks. There are skiers at 
many of Utah's resorts who voluntarily ski off cliffs take massive jumps, attempt 
inverted aerial maneuvers at high speeds and generally take risks that other skiers would 
never wish for. Conversely, there are many skiers who do not wish to confront any other 
risks than those presented by the "bunny slope.' To generally impose upon every Utah 
skier a set of risks that are judicially (not legislatively) determined to be ones that every 
skier v1rishes to confront requires the "bunny slope" skier to accept risks that he or she 
may not be prepared for, and it makes courts or juries rule that skiing off a cliff, for 
instance, is not a risk skiers wish to confront, when, to many skiers, it actually is. In 
other words, judicially imposed generalizations about which risks skiers wish to confront 
should not supersede the personal risk-taking decisions that each skier should be free, and 
in fact encouraged, to make on their own. 
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Similarly, expe1t testimony is not an appropriate basis for determining which risks 
skiers wish to confront because, as explained above, whether a risk is inherent or not is a 
question of duty, and therefore a question of law for the court, not an expert. 
Secondly, confronting risk in skiing is a personal, subjective decision that the 
individual skier makes in his or her mind. Expe1ts should not be allowed to testify 
regarding what someone may or may not have been thinking when they decided to 
confront a risk. For example, in a wrongful death case where the skier's estate sues a ski 
resort claiming that the particular risk \Vhich killed the skier should have been eliminated 
by the res01t, an expert will have little or no basis for determining what the deceased 
skier's internal mental thought processes were in the seconds before his or her death. 
Any expert testimony on such matters would be speculative and lacking in foundation, as 
,vould be any jury verdict based on such testimony. See, Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co .. 3 
Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955) ("ajmy cannot be permitted to speculate"). 
Rather than engage in the speculative and legislatively unsupported exercise of 
letting experts testify on whether skiers wish to confront risks or not, Ski Utah submits 
the better approach is to simply apply the terms of the Inherent Risk Statute. Judges, not 
juries, should identify the risk as pled in the plaintiff/skier's complaint, and determine 
whether that risks falls within the scope of Utah Code§ 78B-4-402 ("Definitions" section 
of Inl1erent Risk Statute containing list of various risks). If the risk falls within the scope 
of section 402, then the claim is ba1Ted. This straightforward textual analysis is hovv 
most statutes are applied, and application of the Inherent Risk Statute should be no 
different. 
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ID. COURTS SHOULD NOT ASSESS WHETHER A RISK CAN BE 
ELIMINATED WITH REASO ABLE CARE 
As explained previously, applying the standard of whether a risk can be eliminated 
with reasonable care is harmful to the sport of skiing in Utah because plaintiff/skiers can 
always claim post-hoc that the risk which injured them could have been eliminated by 
closing the ski run that contained the risk. At minimum, this standard results in 
uncertainty because resorts have no guidance on which ri sks are actually inherent, and at 
its most harmful level it results in resorts preemptively closing large sv,1aths of skiable 
ten-ain for fear of liabil ity exposure. Either result is contrary to the legislature's stated 
intent of rectifying "the confusion of whether a skier assumes the risks inherent in the 
sport of skiing." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-40 l . 
In addition, the Clover and White decisions use the terms "eliminated" and 
"alleviated" interchangeably which makes it even more difficult for resorts to understand 
inherent risk law. See e.g. , Clover, 808 P .2d at 1046-104 7 ("the second category of risks 
consists of those hazards which no one wishes to confront but which cannot be alleviated 
by the use of reasonable care" versus eight sentences later 'if an injury was caused by an 
unnecessary hazard that could have been eliminated by the use of ordinary care, such a 
hazard is not ... an inherent risk"). 
The terms "alleviated'' and "eliminated" have very different meanings when 
applied to ski cases. Every risk could theoretically be alleviated - an orange cone could 
be placed in front of every ice patch, every tree could be padded, or every rock could be 
painted yellow. "Alleviation," therefore does not differentiate between inherent and 
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non-inherent risks. This forces res01ts to guess at whether a risk can be sufficiently 
"alleviated" or whether the resort must eliminate it entirely. 
In short, the standard of whether a risk can be eliminated ( or alleviated) with 
reasonable care is just another reason why inherent risk law in Utah is so dysfunctional. 
It only compounds the problems created by Clover' s "nvo categories of risks," and gives 
judges no clear guidance on bow to decide a dispositive motion under the Inherent Risk 
Statute. Ski resorts have even more difficulty because they must dete1mine how the 
confusing standard applies to their day-to-day operations. 
CONCLUSION 
The consequences of Clover and White are clearly contradictory to the terms of 
the Inherent Risk Statute. Clover and White should be ove1Tuled and the text of the 
Inherent Risk Statute should be applied as drafted. In the event Clover and White are 
retained, the standard of whether a risk can be eliminated/alleviated through reasonable 
care should be discarded as should the analysis of whether a skier wishes to confront 
certain risks . 
DA TED: This 7th day of July, 2016 
Ad~~=-=== 
STRACHAN STRACHAN & SIMON 
Attorneys for Ski Utah 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SKI UT AH' S 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF was served via mail and email on this 7111 day of July, 
2016. 
Eric P. Lee 
Justin Keyes 
JONE WALDO 
1441 W. Ute Blvd., Ste. 330 
Park City, Utah 84098 
elee@ joneswaldo.com 
jkevs@ joneswaldo.com 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
David A. Cutt 
JeffM. Sbaih 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
2015 South State Street, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
dcutt(@.egc]egal. com 
Jsbaih(2i)e2.cle2.a I .com 
Attorneys.for Respondents 
EXHIBIT A 
Kenneth D. Lougee (I 0682) 
Mark R. Taylor (I 1264) 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 266-0999 
kenneth@sjatty.com 
mark@sjatty.com 
Joseph W. Steele (9697) 
STEELE & BIGGS, LLC 
OF COUNSEL TO SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5664 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: 801-266-0999 
joe@sjatty.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ZDl2 M.~R 21 PH I: 43 
FILED 8 '/ f-
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYLE WILLIAMS, individually on behalf of 
her deceased son, JESSE WILLIAMS, and 
GINA WILLIAMS, individually and on 




AMERICAN SKIING COMPANY UTAH, 
INC. (ASCU), and DOES 1-X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON INHERENT RISK 
Case No.080500318 
Judge Keith Kelly 
'This matter came before the Court (?Il January 23, 2012, for oral argument on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Inherent Risk on the issue of whether Plaintiffs' lawsuit 
against The Canyons should be barred because it seeks recovery for a death that resulted from an 
avalanche which defendants allege is an "inherent risk of skiing" as defined by Utah Code Ann., 
§ 78B-4-404, et seq. David C. Biggs, Steele & Biggs, and Mark R. Taylor, Siegfried & Jensen, 
appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs and presented argument; and Adam Strachan and Gordon 
Strachan from Strachan, Strachan & Simon, appeared and presented argument on behalf of 
Defendant. 
Having reviewed the parties' respective motion and memoranda and having considered 
further evidence presented through oral argwnent by counsel for the parties, the Court hereby 
rules and ORDERS as follows: 
l. The Court is required to follow Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P .2d l 03 7 and 
White v. Deseelhors t, 879 P .2d 13 71, because the holdings in these two cases are more analogous 
to the current case than Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp. (175 P .3d 560), and because both are Utah 
Supreme Court cases which specifically interpret the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-4-401, et seq. 
2. Under Clover, the inherent risks of skiing are categorized in two parts: ( 1) those 
dangers that skiers wish to confront as essential characteristics of the sport of skiing, and (2) 
hazards which no one wishes to confront but cannot be alleviated 1 by the use of reasonable care 
on the part of the ski resort. These decisions are also heavily dependent upon the particular facts 
of those cases, indicating to this Court that any analysis of the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act must 
also be similarly based. 
1 The Court notes that in both the decisions of White and Clover, the Supreme Court uses the terms "eliminated" and 
"alleviated" interchangeably. 
3.. This-Court con~ludes that skiers skiing inbo\].1lds at a ski resort do not wish to - -
S/::.1e..rJ do 'YfDf vi.I/.... To CCJY>(r4hf --f jt.e. rU-k <1f be,i',, LU'1<.af i,,,, (J.vdfo.,, d..--l..:, K.4( 
confront the risk of an avalanche. As such, inbounds avalanches like the one at issue m s case 
are not an inherent risk of skiing under the first prong of the Supreme Court's analysis of the 
statute. 
4. With respect to the second prong - whether the risk of avalanches can be 
alleviated through the use of ordinary care - this determination requires an analysis of whether 
the evidence shows a factual dispute over whether the risk could have been so alleviated. The 
Court looks to Exhibit K to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the expert report of Mr. 
Douglas Hansen. His Opinion regarding the facts of the avalanche was as follows: 
On 12/23/07 there was a high likelihood of avalanche on Red Pine Chutes, based 
on The Canyons' prior control records, the record of snow accumulation, and the 
nature of the slope, among other factors; 
The potential avalanche carried with it a high degree of potential harm should the 
avalanche occur on Red Pine Chutes; 
It is impossible to completely eliminate the high risk of serious harm from 
avalanche on Red Pine Chutes even through the exercise of reasonable care in 
controlling avalanches - based on the infonnation I have reviewed, the Canyons 
did not exercise reasonable care before opening the run on 12/23/2007; 
I would not have allowed people I was responsible for to ski Red Pine Chutes on 
12/23/07 in light of the avalanche hazard on that day - The Canyons should not 
have allowed people to ski the run; 
This is especially true because there were many alternate runs available for skiing 
on 12/23/07; 
In order to properly determine whether it was safe to allow people in one's care to 
ski Red Pine Chutes, it is insufficient to rely on a visual inspection or the lack of a 
prior slide in the run on prior days; in conditions like the conditions that were 
present on 12/23/07 in Red Pine Chutes, it would have been prudent to dig a snow 
pit before allowing those in my care to ski the run - based on the information 
provided, The canyons did not properly track the snowpack or perform adequate 
preventative research on Red Pine Chutes before opening it on 12/23/07; 
In brief, it is my opinion in light of everything I have reviewed regarding the Red 
Pine Chutes slope generally and with regard to the avalanche on 12/23/07, that 
Red Pine Chutes is an avalanche-prone slope that presents a risk of serious injury 
or death to skiers on the run if the right conditions are present. 12/23/07 provided 
near ideal conditions for an avalanche on Red Pine Chutes. Among other factors 
that support my opinion, the following factors are important: this run had a prior . 
history of avalanche activity; there was an avalanche that failed on the same layer 
just the day prior on a very similar run; and the slide path presents a danger of 
serious injury or death to a skier caught in an avalanche on the run partly because 
of the presence of trees near the bottom of the run; 
Red Pine Chutes should not have been opened to be skied on 12/23/07, especially 
since an avalanche was triggered the prior day in the Charlie Brown's area (a 
similar run, according to Canyons employees). The Canyons knew that an 
avalanche had been triggered. Avalanches on similar slopes are one of the best 
indicators of avalanche danger. That avalanche should not have been ignored, but 
it seems it was ignored; 
The decision to allow Red Pine Chutes to be skied by the general public was a 
decision that fell short of the standard of care for those that have the lives of 
others in their hands when it comes to skiing on avalanche-prone terrain. 
5. This Court concludes that there are sufficient facts raising the question of whether 
this risk could have been alleviated and eliminated by the use of ordinary care. 
6. In comparing this case with Clover, that case involved a blind jwnp that resulted 
in the injury of a skier below. Tiris Court concludes that one way in which the risk of that blind 
jump could have been alleviated was to close the jump. Similarly in this case, Plaintiff has 
presented evidence that the risk of avalanche on Red Pine Chute on December 23, 2007 could 
have been eliminated by closing the run until it had been made safe for skiers. 
7. This Court is not-ruling that there is no circwnstance under-which an avalanche . 
might be an inherent risk of skiing. However, under the particular facts of this case and the 
analysis performed under the guidance of White and Clover, there is a factual question raised 
about whether The Canyons could have alleviated the hazard or eliminated the hazard through 
the .exercise of ordinary care. 
8. Because of this factual dispute, this Court cannot say as a matter oflaw that The 
Canyons, through the exercise of ordinary care, could not alleviate or eliminate the danger to 
skiers of the inbounds avalanche that killed Jesse Williams on December 23, 2007. 
9. Thus, summary judgment in this case is not appropriate. 
THEREFORE, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Inherent Risk is 
DENIED. 
DATED this V)iy of "/?1a.rc( , 2012. 
Approved as to form: 
~--__ -=:> 2/2-z../,7_ 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. 
Adam Strachan, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
